FOUR

THE LACK OF MODERNITY

When religion ceased to be a political force, politics became a substitute religion.

—Lewis Mumford

According to Buddhism, the three roots of evil are leśṇa greed, dosa ill will, and mohā delusion. Traditionally these are personal problems, but today they must also be understood more structurally, as institutionalized.

Our economic system promotes and requires greed in at least two ways: desire for profit is necessary to fuel the engine of economic growth, and consumers must be insatiable in order to maintain markets for what can be produced. Although justified as raising standards of living worldwide, economic globalization seems rather to be increasing inequality, unemployment, and environmental degradation. The United Nations Development Report for 1997 pointed out that 1.3 billion people now live on less than one dollar a day, and estimated that there are ninety-three countries having a per capita income below what they had a few decades ago.

Long after the end of the Cold War, the U.S. federal government continues to devote the largest percentage of its resources to maintaining an enormously expensive war machine. Most other countries continue to spend more on arms than social services. There is no sign that the military-industrial complex, or the lucrative international market in
arms sales, will be diverted into plowshares anytime in the foreseeable future.

The media that might inform us about these problems distract us with “infotainment” and sports spectacles in order to promote their real function, advertising. One would expect universities to be encouraging and developing the critical thinking necessary to reflect on these developments, but in the midst of the greatest economic expansion in history we are told that budget cutbacks are necessary because there is less money available for education. Increasingly, the need to become more market oriented is diverting academia into corporate research and advanced job training for those eager to join and benefit from a morally questionable world order.

In short, our global economy institutionalizes greed; the military-industrial complex at the heart of most developed nation-states institutionalizes aggression; our media and even our universities institutionalize ignorance of what is actually happening.

Unlike the original Buddhist roots of evil, these institutional roots of evil are rationalized as operating according to a logic (e.g., “laws of the market”) that is inevitable because it is “natural.” From my lack perspective, however, they are better understood as the results of particular historical forces that can and should be challenged. This chapter attempts to understand how those forces encouraged the development of such problematical institutions, which today control the earth and all its “resources” (including us). Nation-states have divided up the earth’s surface and waters and airspace as well as its peoples; transnational corporations exploit the resources of these areas for their own purposes; these claims are policed by war machines that have the power to unleash irresistible violence against those who challenge this world order; and these three are serviced by scientific and technological establishments that exist primarily to meet their insatiable pursuit of ever greater power and wealth.... How did all this come to be?

This chapter argues that our collective sense of lack has been an important factor in developing these institutions. It offers another episode in the social history of lack, supplementing the previous chapter’s account of our individualistic idolatries with a lack history of our institutional idolatries. “Men are literally hypnotized by life and by those who represent life to them,” Ernest Becker has argued; replace “life” with “being” and we begin to realize how our sense of lack is also a source of social domination. All power is sacred power, Becker adds, “because it begins in the hunger for immortality, and it ends in the absolute subjection to people and things that represent immortality.”

...but the spiritual roots of our modern secularization of the nation-state, or of the state’s belief that it must be secular, may be problematized by such considerations. We will see that there are two ways to think about their development because of the anxiety—a collective sense of loss of the sixteenth century and then of the late nineteenth century.

THE ORIGINS

‘Tis all in peeces, all confound.
All just supply, and all fantasy.
Nor now the Prince, Subject, Father, Son.
For every man alone therein.
To be a Phoenix, and die a dox.
None of that kindes, of this:

— John Donne

At the beginning of the Renaissance, the world and its creatures accorded human society a space to create and maintain, at least theoretically, in a Holy Roman Empire that was both holy and Roman. Reality matters less to us than traditionally because of the authority of an expanding Roman empire, offering a great reality (a feature of the organic para-empire of the attempted self-grounding) is a feature of our Medieval groundedness was a feature of the authorities acknowledged the me.

A similar continuity exists in the spiritual and technological for granted. Even in the sixteenth century, Padua, the foremost medical center of the authority of Aristotle. Later, the myth that the ancients’ arts were common, however, not only...
Thus about these problems distractacles in order to promote their interests, universities to be encouraging, necessary to reflect on these diametrically great economic expansion: in values clacks are necessary because there is a need to take and benefit from a moral transformation. Institutions in the militarized most developed nation-states modernize even our institutions: internationalizing institutions.

Rents of evil, these institutional rents according to a logic (e.g., "laws of nature" is "natural") from my lack as the results of patriarchy should be challenged. This chapter traces the development of institutions which today control the earth and its peoples: national and international areas for their own purposes: machines that have the power to do things to those who challenge this world by scientific and technological expertise, its insatiable pursuit of ever more power. A collective sense of lack has been an important force in institutions. It offers another epoch: implementing the previous chapter's critiques with a lack history of our society: the debt of life and life: Ernest Becker has argued; replace this: realize how our sense of lack is also power as sacred power, Becker adds. For immortality, and it ends in the things that represent immortality power" (1975, 49). Again, substituting "being" for "immortality" hints at the spiritual roots of our modern world. In particular, the supposed secularity of the nation-state, corporate capitalism, and mechanistic science may be problematized by summarizing what is known about their origins. We will see that there was something compulsion and delusive about their development because it was motivated by a profound social anxiety—a collective sense of lack—which became "liberated" in the sixteenth century and then channeled in these directions.

THE ORGANIC PARADIGM

'Tis all in pieces, all coherence gone;
All just supply, and all Relation:
Prince, Subject, Father, Sonne, are things forgot,
For every man alone thinkes he hath got
To be a Phoenix, and that there can bee
None of that kinde, of which he is, but hee.


At the beginning of the Renaissance Europeans still understood the world and its creatures according to an organic paradigm: Everything, including human society, has its ordained place within a hierarchically ordered cosmos created and maintained by God. Feudal society was unified, at least theoretically, in a Holy Roman Empire, which, as the joke has it, was not holy, nor Roman, and not really an empire. But the messy reality matters less to us than the political ideal that provided a stability based on the authority of antiquity: a supposed continuation of the Roman empire, offering a groundedness in the past that was as much a feature of the organic paradigm as its opposite, groundedness (and attempted self-grounding) is an essential feature of the modern world. Medieval groundedness was self-consciously religious in that civil authorities acknowledged the moral authority of the Church founded by Peter authorized by Christ.

A similar continuity existed for knowledge both sacred and secular: the spiritual and technological superiority of the ancients was taken for granted. Even in the sixteenth century doctors who trained at Padua, the foremost medical school in Europe, swore an oath to defend the authority of Aristotle. Later Francis Bacon still needed to rail against the myth that the ancients' arts and sciences existed in their purest form at the beginning of time. The medieval attitude has been the more common, however, not only in Europe but throughout world history,
as in the four *kalpas* of Indian myth (which slowly deteriorate from an initial golden age) and the East Asian belief in *mappo* (the decline of the Buddhist dharma since Shakyamuni). If such myths are unbelievable today, our modern myth of progress would have been no more believable to medieval society; and so far as the medieval criterion of improvement was primarily a moral one, perhaps the evidence is no better for ours.

The church's understanding of sin and how to cope with it made the organic paradigm a self-contained system, which, despite wretched poverty and widespread suffering, "worked" in the sense that our human sense of lack was explicitly acknowledged and addressed: All of us inherit the original sin of Adam. Our lack was thus contained because its origins and solution were built into the structure of the Christian universe, which had an inescapable moral dimension. Chapter Two discusses how in the late eleventh century our sins became spiritual offenses against God the impartial Judge, for which we must bear punishment. Such an understanding of lack is quite different from a Buddhist one, but the important point is that each channel the effects of lack both individually and socially. To anticipate what follows: a mechanistic paradigm—the universe as a machine functioning according to objective and morally indifferent laws—implies very different ways of coping with our lack.

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries this medieval paradigm collapsed. From a lack perspective, it was like opening Pandora's box. An enormous amount of anxiety became liberated, because the worldview and institutions that had been managing it were overthrown. "In religion, politics, economics, and society, cherished authorities by the score were under attack, and centuries-old values no longer commanded unquestioned adherence. . . . The sense that all solid landmarks had disappeared pervades the writing of the age—either because men were toppling the landmarks or because they were seeking them in vain" (Rabb 37). The rug was pulled out from beneath religion (the Reformation), government (widespread insurrections and revolution), war (gunpowder made warfare more aggressive), the economy (the discovery of new lands and new forms of business organization), science (the collapse of Aristotelianism), and last but not least nature itself (an exceptional number of natural disasters, especially in the seventeenth century: bad weather, poor harvests, soil exhaustion, famines, and plagues, leading to riots, banditry, etc.). It is not surprising, then, that historians have consistently identified a widespread fear of chaos as the main feature of that era. It preoccupied the forms of discourse that have survived. "It is not difficult to change many men and wounds of understanding, but also not packed by anxiety for their times of storm and stress seldom (Haller 27). The old order, if any, would replace order. The main point of this and the reconstruction that gained a new insight into what triumphalist narrative about worldview, which had constantly replaced by the rise of a more economy. But if lack is finally susceptible only to a spiritual and earlier otherworldly society anymore, if (to reformulate the matter) society is not different, we should look for the consciousness reflecting the rise of modern in order of those threatened them anxiety now liberated by the sin and salvation. . . . What is the modern world?

- The might:
- A bulwark

The Protestant Reformation caused the schism in Western posted his ninety-five thesis instrumental in breaking down place to discuss the causes of preceding centuries had with death, suggesting that the contribution to death (and to lack).
The sense that all solid landmarks of the age—either because men had insurrections and revolutions. The Protestant Reformation is a natural way to begin this story because the schism in Western Christendom between 1517 (when Luther posted his ninety-five theses) and 1564 (when Calvin died) was so instrumental in breaking down the organic paradigm. This is not the place to discuss the causes of that schism, but it is significant that the preceding centuries had witnessed an increasing preoccupation with death, suggesting that the Christian worldview—which offered a solution to death (and to lack)—was already losing its grip on people's
minds. During this period, writes Philippe Aries, the earlier acceptance of death was replaced by more violent representations of it, including a new fascination with bodily decomposition. He quotes Huizinga: "No other epoch has laid so much stress on the thought of death" (Huizinga 134). The physical fact of death replaced the images of final judgment; death was no longer a transition to eternal life but an end in itself. "Those who were formerly Christians discovered their own mortality. They banished themselves from heaven because they no longer had the strength to believe in it in a coherent manner" (Alberto Tenenti, in Aries 128–29). This brought the problem of our lack back into the center of human preoccupation.

As long as there was only one Church there was no church. Religious institutions and ideals were not distinguished from secular ones in the ways we now take for granted. Since the same worldview was more or less maintained by everyone (except Jews and heretics, which is why they were so threatening), salvation through the Church's institutions and mediation "worked" because it was believed to work. When that Church acrimoniously split and God helped neither side to destroy the imparity of the other, the long-term effect of this context between lack solutions was to discredit that type of solution to lack anxiety.

Martin Luther (1483–1546) had been a model Augustinian monk, but his efforts within the Catholic framework of prayer, penance, charity, etc., brought no relief from his deep sense of sinfulness—i.e., did not allay his sense of lack—and the extraordinary success of his alternative suggests that many others felt the same way. His solution postulated a wider gap between weak, corrupt humanity and the righteousness of God. Left to itself, human nature is all falsehood and impurity, a condition hopeless without the intervention of God himself, the source of all goodness and truth. Since humans by themselves can do virtually nothing, the solution is through faith alone in his mercy. It is a free acquittal of the guilty that has nothing to do with sacraments or any other mediation by church or clergy; one can rely only on the Bible, the sole infallible source of religious truth. This was an attempt to return to the original Christianity of Biblical times as Luther understood it.

Two implications of this reformation turned out to be crucial. Projecting all goodness onto a Deity who is elevated so far above our world initiated a dangerous development that would empty this fallen world of its spiritual and moral dimensions. The irrelevance for our salvation of any institutional mediation of the world closed the world off from benefit, which could assuage our lack. Luther offered a new interpretation of original sin about human nature with the soul eliminated the intricate web of the material dimension of this world, all which was set onto an immaterial God of material life and turn it within our world and thus alien to life's easily be sacrality lost" (Mauger).

The medieval continuum had meant that true reality in the potentialities of this temporal world. The new broom of the modern but, as we shall see, unselectively was saturated medieval with today was less the disappearance of continuum between sacred and secular.

Lack of mediation threw our own lack. Luther could challenge him to do so. This is the private relationship with God, the subjective interpretation of Scripture, that required working out on our own.

The doctrine of predestination (1564) further developed both human. Humanity has lost its free will. Our efforts to resolve our lack are no more than the freedom to do good, but good enough. A small portion of the human race is saved. Salvation is a free act of his mercy. Why does God condemn all the rest? Another reason than that He wills it so. We are not permitted that this is a "horrible blindness of omnipotence allowed no other solution."

What effect did this have on our lack? All conventional religious systems there is absolutely nothing you can do about it. It had been decided before
salvation of any institutional mediation or even personal good works closed the world off from being the place where religious activities could assure our lack. Luther's emphasis on justification by faith alone offered a new interpretation of lack that precariously balanced pessimism about human nature with optimism about God, but in the process eliminated the intricate web of mediation that constituted, in effect, the sacramental dimension of this world. "[T]o project the experience of the sacred onto an immaterial God is to shortchange sacredness as a dimension of material life and turn it into an object of worship that is beyond our world and thus alien to life. Sacrality hypostatized (or reified) can easily be sacrality lost" (Maguire 37). And so it would be.

The medieval continuity between the natural and the supernatural had meant that true reality manifested sacramentally in the spiritual potentialities of this temporal world, potentialities that could be developed. The new broom of the Reformers swept this away—not out the door but, as we shall see, under the carpet. What transformed the religiously saturated medieval world into the secular one we experience today was less the disappearance of God than the disappearance of this continuity between sacred and temporal.

Lack of mediation threw each Christian back upon his or her own lack. Luther could challenge the Church because he believed God wanted him to do so. This sanctified the principle of a direct and private relationship with God, which encouraged a proliferation of divisive interpretations of Scripture and, over time, an individualism that required working out one's own solution to one's own lack.

The doctrine of predestination taught by John Calvin (1509–1564) further developed both implications. Because of original sin humanity has lost its free will except to do evil. Without free will all our efforts to resolve our lack are useless. Only divine grace can restore the freedom to do good, but grace is bestowed only upon the elect, that small portion of the human race God has chosen for salvation. His salvation is a free act of his mercy, without any regard for human merit. Why does God condemn all others to eternal damnation? "For no other reason than that He wills to exclude them." Calvin himself admitted that this is a "horrible" doctrine, but God's omniscience and omnipotence allowed no other conclusion.

What effect did this have on the way Calvinists experienced their lack? All conventional religious activities were thrown out the window; there is absolutely nothing you can do that will qualify you for heaven, because it's all decided before you are born. Yet this powerlessness over
our final destiny is not something we humans can live with. Predestination aggravates the anguish of our condition, our lack, unbearably. So a way out of this impasse must be discovered, and it was—or rather, several ways were constructed. If all religious expedients are discredited, secular ones need to be devised: expedients that (so far as motivated by the need to resolve our sense of lack) were infused with a spiritually driven dynamism, although (so far as that motivation is unconscious) a dynamism that tended to take on a life of its own.

THE NATION-STATE

The Nation exists before all things and is the origin of all. Its will is always legal, it is the law unto itself.

—Emmanuel Joseph Sieyes, “What Is the Third Estate?” (1789)

“Nationalism” is the pathology of modern developmental history, as inescapable as “neurosis” in the individual, with much the same essential ambiguity attaching to it, a similar built-in capacity for descent into dementia . . .

—Tom Nairn (1977)

In the last few centuries the most successful god—that is, the god that people have been the most willing to die for—has been one’s own nation. By far the most popular religion today is nationalism, argued Arnold Toynbee, the religion of the masses being the “worship of the deified community concealed under the fine name of patriotism” (98–99). Historians have noticed the curious fact that until the 1630s and 1640s the outcome of the religious struggles remained in doubt “and no government could ignore the force of the passions they aroused. Thereafter, however, religion ceased to be a violent issue” (Rabb 80).

The sudden change makes sense when we realize that a new religion finally crystallized during that chaotic period. As this suggests, the nation-state has been one of the main beneficiaries of the Protestant Reformation. Its development was the political consequence of that schism, but it should be understood as a theological consequence as well. We cannot understand the state until we realize how it also serves a religious function for us.

The struggle between the church and its reformers increased the leverage of civil rulers and the balance of power between church (spiritual authority) and state (worldly authority) swung decisively to the

later. In the sixteenth century, landlords. By 1650 they had rapidly absolutizing state that authority, and then discarded the power.

The development of the concept of the state appropriate the church’s mantle of the (literally, “unconditioned”), spiritual authority by becoming God—who was now conventionally understood long-term consequence was to free state institutions from an imagined authority, and thus became politically self-sufficient, nothing outside itself.

In lack terminology: since the solution to our sense of lack, the alternative was increased allegiances between spiritual and moral authority. The solution to lack. Without an absolute power, the consequence of his new religious subjects came to view him as could collectively ground the imperial emperors who proclaimed their metagalomania, but out of a simplification of it, and a rule. (Becker 1975, 68). Here Becker takes Egypt, but his point is just another of seventeenth-century Europe, a secure sense of power in a

The impersonal state emerged with the gradual effect of its subjects that his religious relations were maintained from the state’s bureau. Such rulers, the lack that had been the nation-states that had once
latter. In the sixteenth century most kings were still basically feudal landlords. By 1650 they had become the supreme embodiments of a rapidly absolutizing state that in effect used them to centralize all civil authority and then discarded them.

The development of the nation-state was thus a two-stage process. Initially, the subordination of Christianity enabled some rulers to reappropriate the church’s mantle of religious charisma. They became absolute (literally, “unconditioned”) rulers because they filled the vacuum of spiritual authority by becoming “secular gods” accountable only to God—who was now conveniently far away, high up in his heaven. The long-term consequence was to centralize all political power in their persons. The eventual disappearance of such absolute rulers did not work to decentralize that absolute power; on the contrary, it in turn freed state institutions from any external authority. Since the state was now believed to represent and embody the people, the nation-state in effect became politically self-grounding and morally responsible to nothing outside itself.

In lack terminology: since the Christian schism problematized that solution to our sense of lack and strengthened feudal overlords, an alternative was increased allegiance to those rulers, whose new aura of spiritual and moral authority radiated the promise of a more worldly solution to lack. Without an absolute sovereign the bureaucratic state could not have developed, for its institutions evolved as the way he or she exercised absolute power. But the sovereign’s authority was a direct consequence of his new religious charisma—i.e., of the fact that his subjects came to view him as a person in whose majestic being they could collectively ground their own lack of being. “The kings and emperors who proclaimed themselves divine did not do so out of mere megalomania, but out of a need for a unification of experience, a simplification of it, and a rooting of it in a secure sense of power” (Becker 1975, 68). Here Becker refers to the early kings of Babylon and Egypt, but his point is just as valid for the sun kings that emerged in seventeenth-century Europe, whose majesty also offered the promise of a secure sense of power in a world falling apart.

The impersonal state evolved in order to mediate this relationship, with the gradual effect of distancing the sovereign so far from his subjects that his religious role (as a solution to lack) became differentiated from the state’s bureaucratic role. With the eventual overthrow of such rulers, the lack that had empowered them continued to empower the nation-states that had coalesced around them. People’s collective
sense-of-self became increasingly constructed around, identified with, their nationality. In the process, however, the religious (i.e., lack) origins of the nation-state have been obscured and issues of moral responsibility impersonalized into the issue of what is best for the nation—e.g., *realpolitik*. The objectification of lack legitimized the new political institution only by becoming alienated from its original spiritual (and ethical) function. As usual with such objectifications, the state returned the favor by subjecting citizens to its own *raison d'état*. Beware of the state, warned Nietzsche, for it will try to persuade you that it is the people. But it was the state that made the nation, and not vice-versa.²

Medieval feudalism tended to fragment because it was a loose structure of mutual obligations based on a hierarchical network of interpersonal relations. Contracts were symbiotic and this applied even to the monarch, who was by no means sovereign (although some polities were more theocratic than others, such as France). Kings usually understood themselves as sitting on top of a pyramid of personal loyalties, not as monarchs of the Roman or Byzantine sort. In the early middle ages the king was often regarded as an elected officer and his position was not necessarily hereditary; even later he was part of the community of the realm and responsible to its laws. Such a system diffused power and fostered what has been called a “massive sublife of numberless associations,” which generated their own systems of rules and courts to adjudicate them. The society that resulted was cross-confessing with overlapping groups and conflicting loyalties and legal systems. One’s *patria* was the town or region where one was born. Loyalty was personal, wars dynastic, and armies mostly mercenary.

Such personalized governance tended to reflect the idiosyncrasies of the local ruler. Since it operated through his household, it was portable and could be set up wherever the royal family established its residence. But such authority worked to undermine itself by shifting effective power downward to the lower links of lord-vassal relations. The long-term trend was fragmentation into increasingly autonomous systems that often quarreled with one another.

This tendency toward “feudal anarchy” was restrained by loyalty to the church, the only responsibility that transcended local group attachments. Because all authority ultimately derived from God, politics too was a branch of theology. Fallen humanity required repressive controls to help people live a Christian life; one must submit even to evil rulers who were scourges sent by God.

It is not surprising, then, that moral authority also created a long struggle for stability. The political thought was the chief poseur order allowed reversion to thirty years’ war that reduced Europe to the edge of a ana
tous, unjust, damnable, repensions in the domestic affairs recognized that only secular. When Pope Innocent rejected the power of the was widely celebrated as a outstanding problems by all the the war, the state was to be a power he could be a

This signified the end of individuating nation-states. Power came to rest solely upon

he first had to increase his and project the majesty of his court and intensify the issue of relatives, close to an extensive, artificial, distinctive world that is, to a lofty place, which the ruler stood in a riority. (Poggi, 68)³

Such mystification worked King, James I of England, to the effect, the new stand-in for on earth ... accountable to the blasphe, to dispute a king. King is to the State” (Touly)

But how can one personations were needed to manage. For example, Tudor ministers had salaried civil servants to in the crown was dependent upon
constructed around, identified with. However, the religious (i.e., lack of belief), obscured and issues of moral nature of what is best for the nation of lack legitimized the being alienated from its original with such objectifications, the citizens to its own raison d’État. For it will try to persuade you to make the nation, and fragment because it was a loose on a hierarchical network of symbiotic and this applied even to the sovereign (although some states, such as France). Kings usually of a pyramid of personal lord or Byzantine sort. In the early had as an elected officer and his later was part of the rule of its laws. Such a system been called a “massive sublife of their own systems of rules that resulted was cross-conflicting loyalties and legal systems where one was born. Loyalty was mostly mercenary. Realized to reflect the idiosyncrasies through his household, it was the royal family established its to undermine itself by shifting other links of lord-vassal relations. This into increasingly autonomous to one another.

Anarchy was restrained by loyalty that transcended local groups that were derived from God, politics and society required repressive control, must submit even to evil rulers.

The Lack of Modernity

It is not surprising, then, that the final schism in the church’s moral authority also created a political crisis that resulted in a century-long struggle for stability. The favorite conceit of seventeenth-century political thought was the chaos that threatened society if lack of imposed order allowed reversion to a state-of-nature. After an exhausting thirty years’ war that reduced the population by a third and brought Europe to the edge of an anarchic abyss, the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) was widely celebrated as a once and for all settlement of all the outstanding problems by all the major powers. Its enshrined noninterference in the domestic affairs of other states and (to counter the Papacy) recognized that only secular states could exercise political sovereignty. When Pope Innocent rejected the treaty as “null, void, invalid, iniquitous, unjust, damnable, reprobat, inane, empty of meaning and effect for all time,” he could be and largely was ignored.

This signified the emergence of a new world order: a collection of individuating nation-states ruled by increasingly absolute sovereigns. Power came to rest solely with the monarch, but to exercise it he first had to increase his own prominence, had to magnify and project the majesty of his powers by greatly enlarging his court and intensifying his glamour. The absolute ruler’s court was no longer the upper section of his household, a circle of relatives, close associates, and favored dependents. It was an extensive, artifically constructed and regulated, highly distinctive world that appeared to outsiders (and to foreigners) to be a lofty plateau, an exalted stage at the center of which the ruler stood in a position of unchallengeable superiority. (Poggi, 68)3

Such mystification worked to transfer spiritual authority from Pope to King. James I of England (1603–1625) emphasized that he was, in effect, the new stand-in for God. The monarchy is “the supreme thing on earth... accountable to none but God only.” If to deny God was blasphemy, to dispute a king was sedition. “What God is to Nature, the King is to the State” (Toulmin 127).4

But how can one person wield such vast authority? New institutions were needed to make that authority effective. In England, for example, Tudor ministers had no army, no police, not even a corps of salaried civil servants to implement their policies. In most places the crown was dependent upon unpaid justices of the peace drawn from
the ranks of the local nobility and gentry. This presupposed an accommodation with the interests of the landed classes. As the centralizing authority of the crown increased, however, one after another institution of the royal household "went out of court" to become a bureaucratic department of state, still subject to the will of the king but free from day-to-day interference. In the 1530s Thomas Cromwell, Henry VIII's chief minister and closest confidant, initiated the division of the royal household into the principle ministries of modern government. The King's council, originally an informal circle of advisers, evolved into the Privy Council, a more regularized committee of ministers who determined and implemented royal policy.

All this required a new conception of law, which by no coincidence paralleled the new understanding of natural law that the "natural philosophy" of Bacon and Descartes was helping to establish. The traditional understanding had based legal validity ultimately on the will of God, but his agency operated through the slow sedimentation of custom and negotiated accommodations among various semi-autonomous spheres (clerical law, guild regulations, etc.). The idea that the sovereign will of a ruler could replace common law with new statute law was revolutionary, borrowed as chapter Two shows from the Papal reformation. Because a ruler increasingly addressed himself to the whole population, in more uniform and abstract terms applicable everywhere and to everyone, there was a "leveling effect" that tended to eliminate the traditional plurality of overlapping authorities. In relation to the irresistible sovereignty of the king, everyone else was in principle equally subjugiated—just as the absolute sovereignty of the Protestant Deity eliminated mediacion and transcended everyone and everything equally.

Absolutism was not established without resistance. In the middle of the seventeenth century there were upheavals in many places, most dramatically in Cromwell's Commonwealth (1649-1659) and the French Fronde (1648-1652). In the long run, however, the revolutionaries were unable to maintain responsible national governments without slynings (or father-kings) to legitimize the fragile political entities that were still crystallizing. In other words, the explanation of their failure may be a religious one: the problem of legitimacy and loyalty was how to transfer spiritual and moral authority from a fragmenting church to civil rulers, whose new charisma offered a more secular solution to one's felt lack of being. More pluralistic or impersonal alternatives lacked this charisma.

LACK Absolutism. Any new destruction. As the King's power rights and prerogatives, it becomes instead more unwise and good.

Discussing the Prussian model, the state was made transparent, its head through the deepening its power. Public law single autonomous entity operating principle were interchanged, were expected to employ, ship, loyalty to the state.

As the king and his glamorous everyday workings of state became indispensable to those working absolute power that, once could such a foundation.

The most important person, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) detached from the usual thought kings. In place of divine right, a simple mechanical structure. Following the metaphysics he knew personally, he applies society.

Hobbes's social theory experienced first-hand. He fought the English civil war, and his exile. Hobbes concluded the greatest good civil peace, precisely "a perpetual and ceaseth only in death." We might
This presupposed an accomplished classes. As the centralizing process, one after another institution part" to become a bureaucratic will of the king but free from Thomas Cromwell, Henry VIII initiated the division of the royal voice of modern government. The voice of advisers, evolved into the office of ministers who determined the evolution of law, which by no coming of natural law that the Hearne was helping to establish. His legal validity ultimately obtained through the slow sedimentation of modifications among various semi-regulations, etc.). The idea that he place common law with new law as chapter Two shows from Dworkin increasingly addressed himself to the problem of abstract terms applicable to the concept of overlapping authorities. The idea of the king, everyone else about as the absolute sovereignty coordination and transcended everything without resistance. In the middle of the seventeenth century (1649–1659) and the French Revolution (1789), however, the revolutionary nationalism governments without surplus of fragile political entities that had previously the best explanation of their dilemma of legitimacy and loyalty and authority from a fragmenting its political tradition. Judaism offered a more secular rather than pluralistic or impersonal

Absolute sovereignty nevertheless contained the seeds of its own destruction. As the king's power develops from a collection of various rights and prerogatives, it becomes instead more unitary and abstract, more potential, as it were. As such, it begins to detach itself conceptually from the physical person of the ruler; we might put it another way and say that it subsumes the ruler within itself, radiating its own energy through him. (Poggi 74)

Discussing the Prussian model, Poggi points out that:

the state was made transcendent over the physical person of its head through the depersonalization and objectification of its power. Public law shaped the state as an artificial, organizational entity operating through individuals who in principle were interchangeable and who in their official activities were expected to employ their certified abilities in stewardship, loyalty to the state and commitment to its interests. (76)

As the king and his glorious court ascended ever higher above the everyday workings of state power, they became less relevant and more dispensable to those workings: finally, a mere theoretical foundation for absolute power that, once centralized into the state, no longer needed such a foundation.

The most important philosopher of the new nation-state was Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), for whom politics is a secular affair detached from the usual theological argument for the divine right of kings. In place of divine right, he attempted to reconstruct society as a simple mechanical construct grounded on axioms about human nature. Following the metaphysical example of Descartes (whom he read and knew personally), he applied the new deductive method to human society.

Hobbes's social theory was a direct response to the social chaos he experienced first-hand. He prided himself as "the first of all that fled" the English civil war, and wrote his Leviathan (1651) during French exile. Hobbes concluded that the greatest evil is civil war and the greatest good civil peace. Man's distinctive quality is egoism, more precisely "a perpetual and restless desire for power after power, that ceaseth only in death." We may wonder whether this is truly "a general
inclination of all mankind,” but it has considerable validity as a description of how many people reacted to the political chaos of his times, when lack of social stability did not allow other inclinations to flourish. The only antidote was “that great Leviathan . . . that mortal God, to which we owe under the immortal God our peace and defense,” a sovereign who is able to establish order because it is to the advantage of all others to submit to his authority, as the wielder of supreme authority and who can guarantee his subjects’ rights. A modern nation-state requires an irresistible force at the center that constrains the activities of all those under it. This solution provided order, peace and control through a set of accepted rules governing the operation of a machine. His sovereign, who was the external embodiment of contracted unity and dispenser of these rules, operated from outside the machine like a technician. The state, created ex nihilo, was an artificial ordering of individual parts, not bound together by cohesion, as an organic community, but united by fear. (Toulmin 211–12)

This Leviathan is “but an artificial man . . . in which the sovereignty is an artificial soul” providing not life but “artificial motion.” One could not find a better image for the new bureaucratic machinery of the state. A society of individuals equally subjugated to an absolute ruler requires bureaucracy, which provides fairness and consistency because it is based on a set of rational rules applying to all. Its formality increases objectivity by reducing subjective decision making. In the Weberian ideal-type, bureaucratic role identification minimizes personal relations by maximizing functional relations. The more personal interaction is subordinated to functionally motivated interaction, the more efficient the bureaucracy and the more people become parts of a social machine—interchangeable parts, for such a bureaucracy “equalizes” people by abstracting the rights and obligations they have in common. From another perspective, it is the victory of means over ends, form over content. The impersonal efficiency of instrumental rationality overshadows the results of such procedures, perhaps most obviously in modern judicial systems.

“An artificial ordering of parts united by fear” gets at the heart of the issue: the contrast between the mutuality of an organic community and the fear that motivates Hobbes’ contractual state. This ordering is externally imposed and supersedes interests, for “except that they be given power, every man will dread the control, the trust in the public realm prevents the reason for overarching laws and effective means to address procedures engendering trust in them and respect for law. But this

As trust diminishes and particularly legal bureaucratic maintenance of social order is of society itself. In this case, it is inversely related to power, so bureaucracy can be viewed (Cordella 35).

The local breakdown of traditionally atomised populations whose only means of defending the assertion of individual rights is to become a vicious circle, bringing the breakdown of personal ties and communities more dependent on the state and greater state sovereignty. That in turn gets public and private (trust and intimate relationships) and the postulates.

The Anabaptists (Menn) that such a state is inherent rejected the Lutheranism/Calvinism state (and the new capitalism in its civil affairs, because state mutualist vision of community as hopelessly old-fashioned, the rest of us are just begin.

No one would willingly accept the state, which is why a “non
The concept of authority is an essential aspect of modern society. It is derived from the idea of a social contract, where the sovereign is viewed as an artificial being, constructed by humans to meet their needs. The sovereign is a fiction, a reflection of the social order, and it is through this fiction that we can understand the nature of authority.

As trust diminishes among individuals, bureaucracies, particularly legal bureaucracies, become more integral to the maintenance of social order and ultimately to the existence of society itself. In this context, law can be viewed as being inversely related to personal trust. With respect to trust, bureaucracy can be viewed as the antithesis of community.

(Cordella 35)

The local breakdown of traditional communities creates “mobile and atomised populations whose claim to humanity rests more and more on the assertion of individual rights vis-à-vis an impersonal, distant and highly bureaucratised government apparatus.” (Camilleri 24). This tends to become a vicious circle, benefiting only the self-aggrandizing state: the breakdown of personal trust and mutualist community makes citizens more dependent on the state to achieve safe and peaceful societies, and greater state sovereignty tends to replace the role of mutualist communities. That in turn generates the modern distinction between public and private (trust and mutuality become limited to the most intimate relationships) and thus promotes the very individualism that it postulates.

The Anabaptists (Mennonites, Amish, Hutterites, etc.) understood that such a state is inherently coercive and reacted against it. They rejected the Lutheran/Calvinist accommodation with the new nation-state (and the new capitalist mode of production) by refusing to engage in its civil affairs, because state authority was antithetical to their own mutualist vision of community. Today the Anabaptists are usually viewed as hopelessly out-of-fashion, but perhaps they saw a basic problem that the rest of us are just beginning to understand.

No one would willingly invest his or her loyalty in such a bureaucracy, which is why a “mortal God” was needed. That deity became
dispensable once obedience to his institutions had been established at the cost of localized authorities and mutualist loyalties. The sovereignty of absolute rulers had been based upon their new role (taken over from the church) as the temporal agents of almighty God’s spiritual and moral authority. Louis XIV believed that military victory or defeat was God’s reward or punishment, for a sovereign good or bad was an agent of God. When that role became questionable sovereign too became disposable, leaving the nation-state as “no longer derived from the divinely ordained harmony of the universal whole, . . . no longer explained as a partial whole which was derived from, and preserved by, the existence of a greater: it was simply explained by itself” (Giereke 40).

Today the nation-state remains self-justifying and self-empowering, devoted wholly to its own interests.

More precisely, a self-empowering process for those interests constantly need to be modified as demographic, military, economic, and political environments change. The equilibrium of such an international system is thus precarious and requires constant readjustment. This ongoing tension cannot be relieved by the operation of binding international norms, for strictly speaking there are no such norms except those that the greater powers temporarily agree upon and can impose on lesser ones. Self-justifying means the disappearance of any overarching moral principles regulating states’ conduct, for what international law there is operates among states and not above them. Hence:

persistent tension between, on the one hand, the absoluteness of the notions of sovereignty and raison d’état (which articulated and legitimated each system’s commitment to self-aggrandizement), and, on the other, the continuous and inescapable presence of other states baulking that “will to sovereignty.” Over and over again, each state came up against limits to its sovereignty in the form of competing states striving to satisfy their own self-defined interests. (Poggi 90).

Although much of the competition among developed nations has shifted from military to economic, our situation otherwise remains much the same. The present political polytheism is inherently unstable. The “sense of insecurity, of which nationalism was supposed to be the cure, persisted in the culture of the nation-state” (Nandy 265). At the time they emerged nation-states were a product of the early seventeenth-century international “community” led by any moral restraints, political tragedies of the twentieth century much the cure was better than the disease.

With royal charisma replaced by religious grounding of civil authority, supposedly secular institutions engender a need to identify with a greater force greater than ourselves. Each person, some kind of authority, some power which gives him the means to make visits to the moon were considered making offerings there, but by powerful (1971, 151, 198). In a world no longer belief, we have devised other sources of power to conform to our own. In his famous lecture, Weber said that political entities, conscripted one. The basic problem is that states have provided a weak subject, and an even weaker solution to a complex situation that are otherwise unable to fulfill their mission.

Perhaps this gives us some indication that states are liable to, what amounts to some higher supraindiividual impersonal machinery of the whole consciously seek from it—a collective learn from the Anabaptists how the nation needs to be transformed to resolve our lack. If states retain the power to make it into a better religion. The fascists and state socialism of the same, was “an attempt to escap
Institutions had been established at altruist loyalties. The sovereignty of their new role (taken over from almighty God's spiritual and military victory or defeat was no longer derived from the universal, . . . no longer explained by itself” (Giereke 40). The sovereignty too became satisfying and self-empowering.

The process: for those interested in demographic, military, economic, the equilibrium of such an institution requires constant readjustment enlightened by the operation of self-interests. Speaking there are no such powers temporarily agree upon. Satisfying means the disappearance of regulating states’ conduct, operates among states and not on the one hand, the abso-

Lack of Modernity

The lack of modernity towards which states are liable to, when they reject bureaucratic utilitarianism in favor of a quest for self-transcendence that involves surrendering to some higher supraindividual destiny. Since the instrumentalist and impersonal machinery of the state cannot give us what we unconsciously seek from it—a collective solution to our lack—one might learn from the Anabaptists; however, one might conclude instead that the nation needs to be transformed into a “purer” institution that can resolve our lack. If states retain the traces of their religious origins, as I am arguing, we can expect periods when its citizens are tempted to make it into a better religion. The results have been tragic, especially the fascisms and state socialisms of the twentieth century. Fascism, for example, was “an attempt to escape from the disciplines of ‘stateness,’ from
not only the emphasis on depersonalization which follows from the state’s bureaucratic and legal character but also the idea of state and society as distinct realms” (Dyson 59).

As Friedrich Hölderlin put it, what has always made the state a hell on earth has been that man has tried to make it his heaven. This failure is not incidental but essential to its unconscious spiritual function for us. Insofar as we collectively try to become real through the nation-state, it can never become real enough to satisfy us, because it too is a human construct, “empty” and ungrounded despite the national origin myths spun to mystify it. In lack terms, our objectified and depersonalized lack anxiety internally feeds the unresolved tension between state and civil society, and externally feeds the incessant competition among nations that constitutes the precarious “international order.” In short, so far as the state has become a religious institution for us, it is doomed to be a poor one.

Yet what is the alternative? From its inception, there has been an ongoing argument about the proper activities of the state. The younger Johann Fichte, Alexander von Humboldt, and Immanuel Kant, for example, hesitated to acknowledge that the state has any common purpose except security. They saw it as a common framework within which subjects pursue their own ends. On the other side, Gottfried Leibniz, the later Fichte, and Johann Herder attributed a more substantive cultural mission to the state; for Hegel the people are that part of the state that does not know what it wants.

Historically, at least, the argument was settled by Karl Marx: the end of royal sovereignty led to states restructuring themselves to sustain capitalist domination. Today this means states identify so much with the economy that they operate largely at the service of the industrial process. As Dan Hamburg concluded from his years in the U.S. Congress (D, Calif.): “The real government of our country is economic, dominated by large corporations that charter the state to do their bidding. Fostering a secure environment in which corporations and their investors can flourish is the paramount objective of both [political] parties” (25). Economic growth is unanimously endorsed by all political leaders as the standard to judge each state’s performance, as self-justifying and validating whatever burdens it might cause the state to impose upon society (Poggi 133).

The result of this is very different from the pseudo-religious aspirations of fascism, but today we are realizing that such a state can be just as problematic.

Gold constitutes treasure, a way to fill the religious needs in this world, as also for Purgatory, and restoring the faith in the (Christopher Columbus)

At the same time the nation-state is also being born: other secular avenues offer a way to fill in our secular and religious. As people began to have a confusion about the way to go, Purgatory became more important. But the secular attraction was repressed and used as an economic drive to be distorted.

This brings us to what Nietzsche finds at the origins of capitalism; a lack of purpose, by adding another perspective that it is that capitalism originated in the Christian ethics, lack implies that capitalist is its psychological structure.

According to The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, the belief in predestination needed to determine whether or not the choice of work, of profession, of fate was to be accepted as a demon of ascetic values from one hand, as one labored to prove oneself, meeting any surplus. This origin of preoccupation with capital and production became our main obsession. Since there being no other final salvation, means has become our end. A national ethos may have lost its own to any the less powerful. Our orientation.

Lack fills in a psychological way in Calvinist spirit. Calvinist destiny is already decided to do to qualify for heaven, why
The Lack of Modernity  

CORPORATE CAPITALISM

Gold constitutes treasure, and he who possesses it has all he needs in this world, as also the means of rescuing souls from Purgatory, and restoring them to the enjoyment of Paradise. (Christopher Columbus)

At the same time the nation-state was taking shape, other gods were also being born: other secular projects that, since they too seemed to offer a way to fill in our sense of lack, may also be understood as religious. As people began to have doubts about the afterlife, or at least confusion about the way to get there, economic success in this life became more important. But if the spiritual motivation behind this attraction was repressed and unconscious, one should also expect this economic drive to be distorted in some uncomfortable ways.

This brings us to what Max Weber wrote about Puritanism and the origins of capitalism; a lack reading supplements Weber's argument by adding another perspective on that development. If Weber is correct that capitalism originated in the "This-worldly" asceticism of Puritan ethics, lack implies that capitalism remains essentially religious in its psychological structure.

According to The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Calvinist belief in predestination encouraged what became an irresistible need to determine whether one was among the chosen. Such predestination devalued everything conventionally religious—ritual, confession, penance, acts of charity, etc.—in favor of economic success that came to be accepted as demonstrating God's favor. That had the effect of importing ascetic values from the monastery into worldly vocations, as one labored to prove oneself saved by reinvesting rather than consuming any surplus. This original motivation slowly evaporated but our preoccupation with capital and profit has not. On the contrary, it has become our main obsession. Since we no longer have any other goal, there being no other final salvation to believe in, in this way too the means has become our end. As Weber emphasized, the ascetic vocational ethos may have lost its original meaning yet that does not make it any the less powerful. Our type of salvation still requires a future orientation.

Lack fills in a psychological gap in this model. If my arbitrary Calvinist destiny is already decided and there is absolutely nothing I can do to qualify for heaven, why should I bother to exert myself in any
way? The point is that we cannot live with this kind of aggravation to our anxiety; predestination exaggerates the anguish of our condition and destiny—our lack—unbearably. A way out must be discovered. There is no direct causal relation between material success and eternal salvation; wealth can only be a sign of God’s approval. But psychologically there tends to be no significant difference; working hard for such a sign provides an opportunity to direct one’s lack anxiety in a way that can hope to alleviate it—with the nice extra fillip that since you can never be sure of God’s grace (your business might fail tomorrow) you can never relax enough to enjoy the fruits of your labors.

In a way analogous to the eventual overthrow of absolute sovereigns, the Calvinist God could also eventually disappear, but by then it did not matter because he too was not needed anymore. The psychological structures that had formed—use capital to get more capital; always jam tomorrow, never jam today—had taken on a life of their own and objectified into new economic institutions, which in turn have objectified us into their servants.

The main difference between medieval and modern economic thinking is that the former subordinates economic motivations to the moral authority of the Deity, while the latter accepts no such moral supervision. In secular terms, the first subsumes the economy to the society, the second subsumes society to economic expediency, which it liberates from social restraints (usually religious in form).

A good example of religious restraint against such a “liberation” was the medieval Church’s condemnation of usury—what we now call interest, something necessary for money to function as capital. Usury was prohibited because a usurer profits from something (i.e., time) that belongs only to God; money is infertile, so it is against nature for money looted to spawn more money. Jacques Le Goff’s analysis of penance, purgatory, and usury in the late Middle Ages supplements Weber’s argument by showing how the Church unwittingly undermined its own prohibition. Originally its doctrine of sin and penance focused on the act rather than the actor. Over time that doctrine became more internalized, as Confession changed from a collective and public event, reserved for the most serious sins, to a more private act that after 1215 was obligatory at least once a year. The confessor’s priority changed from chastising a fault to cleansing the person.

This new preoccupation with daily intentions encouraged an introspection that would eventually transform ways of thinking and behaving. It also led to the development of a new intermediary realm, Purgatory, of this purga, loved ones still in and indulgences from the Church.

Thus was built the system challenged. One unintended result of accumulated wealth of a contrite using a way out of Purgatory. "In a society conscience, obstacles were, first of escaping Hell, thanks to Pur economy and society of the theism" (Le Goff 93). Since a use the services of the church, had been much different from the both cases, a new religious attitude the supreme value.

The development of modern political theory, is usually preservative explanation. The organ into different spheres—religion, assuming an independent vital own nature. States operate as markets fluctuate according to factors. From a lack perspective, understood as a shift from a conscious lack—our need to become religious motivations functionate and in the development into institutions, those object with the Calvinist Deity or the willing to die for one’s country of the eagerness of early Church distinction we may make better.

The same is true for religion distinguished more rituals to the world, from salvation reject a new message or process ensure the perpetuation of gander the social system, includes adherents of this type of religi
Purgatory, for further contrition and cleansing the sinner. But the duration of this purification could vary according to the prayers and concern of loved ones still on earth—which might show itself by buying masses and indulgences from the church to hasten their graduation to paradise.

Thus was built the system of “spiritual materialism” that Luther challenged. One unintended result was to legitimate usury. The accumulated wealth of a contrite usurer could be used, in effect, to buy his way out of Purgatory. “In a society where all conscience was a religious conscience, obstacles were, first of all—or finally—religious. The hope of escaping Hell, thanks to Purgatory, permitted the usurer to propel the economy and society of the thirteenth century ahead toward capitalism” (Le Goff 93). Since a usurer would need to save money to buy the services of the church, his psychological structure may not have been much different from the Puritan asceticism Weber described. In both cases, a new religious attitude inadvertently worked to make money the supreme value.

The development of modern economic theory, like modern political theory, is usually presented as a shift from a religious to a naturalistic explanation. The organic synthesis of medieval Europe fractured into different spheres—religious, political, economic, scientific—each assuming an independent vitality by acting according to the laws of its own nature. States operate according to their own raison d’état, and markets fluctuate according to a calculus of impersonal economic factors. From a lack perspective, however, this development is better understood as a shift from a conscious to an unconscious religious paradigm. If lack—our need to become real—is a constant spiritual drive, we can see religious motivations functioning both in the evolution of the nation-state and in the development of market capitalism. Once crystallized into institutions, those objectified motivations do not disappear along with the Calvinist Deity or the spectacular courts of sun kings. To be willing to die for one’s country is to assign a spiritual role to the nation (cf. the eagerness of early Christian martyrs) that is impervious to any distinction we may make between church and state.

The same is true for market capitalism. Weber’s sociology of religion distinguished more ritualistic and legalistic religions, which adapt to the world, from salvation religions more hostile to it, which seek to inject a new message or promise into everyday life. Their efforts to ensure the perpetuation of grace in the world ultimately require reordering the social system, including its economics. Weber noticed that adherents of this type of religion usually “do not enjoy inner repose
because they are in the grip of inner tensions." This suggests that market capitalism began as, and still remains, a form of salvation religion: dissatisfied with the world as it is and compelled to inject a new promise into it, motivated (and justifying itself) by faith in the grace of profit and concerned to perpetuate that grace, with a missionary zeal to expand and reorder (rationalize) the economic system. Then our secular economic values are not only derived from religious ones (salvation from injecting a revolutionary new promise into daily life), they are much the same future-oriented values, although largely unconscious owing to the loss of reference to any otherworldly dimension.

The psychohistories (or religio-histories) that Weber and Le Goff outline might have been only footnotes to history had they not encouraged, and been encouraged by, some corresponding developments in economic organization. The first corporations with limited legal liability were established in the middle of the sixteenth century, perhaps the earliest in Florence in 1532. Both the place and date are revealing. Recent discoveries meant there were vast profits to be made in the East and in the New World; Vasco da Gama’s trip to India in 1498 resulted in profits sixty times its costs. But such ventures were expensive and risky, given the debtors’ prisons that awaited bankrupts and their families. The clever solution was limited liability: you could lose only what you invested. This required a special charter from one’s ruler, which he was usually pleased to provide for a cut of the profits. The significant points here are, first, that from its beginnings corporations were involved in colonial exploitation, because that is what they were created to do; and second, that this has usually involved an incestuous relationship with the state, which used them to exploit distant resources that could not otherwise be “developed.” Without the enormous resources that such corporations imported from the colonies—initially vast amounts of gold and silver (which resulted in severe and destabilizing inflation in the sixteenth century)—the bureaucratic nation-state could not have developed, for there was insufficient domestic capital available for such centralized control.

Prior to gunpowder warfare was primarily defensive: the issue was usually whether an army could hold out a siege. This changed forever in 1494, when Charles VIII of France used artillery to breach the walls of the Italian city-states. As the gunpowder revolution spread, “a feeling of insecurity swept all of Europe” (Herz 474). War became more aggressive, which led to the development of large standing armies and the expense of financing their military adventures, leading in turn to the development of first bank early into what Lewis Mumford called national states, and the empire of military occupations of their governors for armed assault” (349). Paul, in his great war and its consequences progressed toward nation building than a series of changes (90). Charles Tilly explained how the state made the state and the state made aggression.

A Japanese colleague once remarked that the most striking in the history of modernity is the speed with which three centuries Europe transformed. From this historical standpoint, it is curious that not everyone“high culture” are to be supreme as an idea that developed in Europe. The factor was probably the religious factor, but another was the increasingly diverted the attention of the new state.

Nevertheless, I suspect that much of the Eurasian landmass came to be something fully explained by what should take for granted. I mean the transformative power of the nationalist corporation, its role in virtually the same manner that was liberating vast amounts of land and its role in the problem of subjugating the rest of the world. The second was the social response to increased anxiety, and that the historical development of Europe, collectively? One way to secure was in incorporating the other. Thanks to this was not only that nation state newly discovered and area across the

The New World also offers a

As interminable intermezzo st
This suggests that market form of salvation religion—dispelled to inject a new promise by faith in the grace of profit—was with a missionary zeal to economic system. Then our secular form of religious ones (salvation’s rise into daily life), they are, although largely unconscious of their worldliness dimension.

Le Goff and Le Goff to history had they not entirely corresponding developments with limited legal place and date are revealing. May profits to be made in the East trip to India in 1498 resulted vessels were expensive and tended bankrupts and their families; you could lose only what a worker from one’s ruler, which of the profits. The significant beginnings corporations were that what they were created evolved an incestuous relationship and exploited distant resources that about the enormous resources colonies—initially vast amounts were and destabilizing inflationic nation-state could not have domestic capital available for such.

Primarily defensive: the issue was a siege. This changed forever artillery to breach the walls of revolution spread, “a feeling of 474.” War became more large standing armies and the leading in turn to the development of the first banks. The result is that nation-states evolved early into what Lewis Mumford (1970) calls “war states”: “all the great national states, and the empires formed around a national core, are at bottom war states; their politics are war politics; and the all-absorbing preoccupation of their governing classes lies in collective preparation for armed assault” (349). Paul Kennedy has more recently argued that war and its consequences provided more urgent and sustained pressures toward nation building than any philosophical considerations or social changes (90). Charles Tilly expresses the point most succinctly: “war made the state and the state made war” (42). But what motivated this aggression?

A Japanese colleague once commented to me that what he found most striking in the history of the West was its extraordinary aggressiveness. For approximately three-quarters of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Europe tore itself to pieces. From a comparative standpoint, it is curious that this did not result in forcible reunion. Every other “high culture” area had been dominated by an empire that believed itself to be supreme and essentially alone in its world; the states system that developed in Europe was therefore unique (Poggi 88). One factor was probably the religious disagreements that stiffened the backs of resisters, but another was the timely discovery of New Worlds, which increasingly diverted the attention of rulers to more profitable ventures overseas.

Nevertheless, I suspect that this aggression, whereby a tiny corner of the Eurasian landmass came to dominate the rest of the globe, is not something fully explained by religious civil war. Nor is it something we should take for granted, any more than we should accept the nation-state or the transnational corporation as something inevitable. Consider the timing: at virtually the same moment that the organic paradigm collapsed, liberating vast amounts of lack anxiety and preoccupying elites everywhere with the problem of subduing chaos, Western Europe began to conquer the rest of the world. Psychologically we know that one personal response to increased anxiety and fear can be aggression; does the historical development of Europe suggest that the same may be true collectively? One way to secure ourselves is to expand by dominating and incorporating the other. Thanks to new technological developments, the other was not only that nation-state coalescing next door; it was that newly discovered land across the sea, more vulnerable to conquest.

The New World also offered a new world for religious projection. As interminable internecine strife made Europe seem irredeemable,
America became much more than an abode of heathen to be converted and exploited. For some it was an empty land where religious and/or civil utopias could be achieved (as we shall see in the next chapter). For others its primitives exemplified a simple human happiness prior to the corruptions of civilization. For both, the New World became a place where our lack was or could be resolved.

The disintegration of the organic paradigm into different spheres, each operating according to its own objective laws, is usually taken to have liberated those spheres from any moral authority. If, however, the formation and function of these spheres reveal religious motivations, then a moral dimension is also inescapable insofar as religion always has ethical implications. Then, instead of accepting the moral neutrality that these “secular” spheres claim for themselves, we should look for the ways they deny or diffuse ethical responsibility.

A good example of such diffusion is provided by the limited-liability corporation and its twin the joint-stock market, the first chartered in England in 1553. Shares in a corporation could now be traded freely and even anonymously. Legally, the primary responsibility of a corporation is neither to its employees nor to its customers but to its stockholders, today mostly unknown, scattered here and there, and usually with no interest in a corporation’s business except its profitability. Medieval production had been mostly for local markets, which meant that responsibility for one’s actions was also mostly local, to one’s immediate community. Contrast that with what happened in Bhopal, India, in 1984, where a Union Carbide plant leaked toxic gases that killed up to 10,000 people and permanently injured another 50,000. The plant had been poorly supervised, and recommendations from earlier problems and accidents had not been implemented by top management. So who was responsible? The CEO and members of the board of Union Carbide, like the thousands of anonymous people who own it, live far away, and legal liability—usually only financial—is quite different from having to live with the consequences.

This difference has great consequences for the way that impersonal institutions like transnational corporations can conduct their business. It has been said that “a principle purpose of corporations is to shield the managers and directors who run them, and shareholders who profit, from responsibility for what the corporation actually does.” Today the most powerful ones have learned to play off nations and communities against one another in order to obtain the most profitable operating lease income. Regulation and taxation can become freer than nation-state borders and peoples. With no corporate limits it is convenient business, if it is convenient.

Of course, to be incorporated legal, not a physical, body. Like corporations, however, corporations are distinctive raw materials that is processes which thrive income must exceed externalities at their intrinsic limit to their growth person (because entitled to 0.73). Emotional bonds to anyone or to another among anonymous stockholders diffuse all ethical (apart from among an anonymous stockholder). Responsibility to anything else evaporates. Corporations have become self-sufficient with increasing access to all the means of pursuing their own interests.

The problem, then, is not that they do well—for themselves, for themselves—and Smith’s references to them as “a system of worms in the body politic” is apt. Modernized lack has made them the collective objectification of one’s standard of living as for an economy for that ambition, there is no reason to be just. As I can never be wealthy or never be big enough, corporations can never consume preoccupation with growth without never-actually-comes gives us something today; the reality is that out evading a present we are less Mers.

My aim is to show that not to a divine organism.
able to be converted to productive land where religious and other conflicts can be resolved. For example, the New World became a place of peace.

The divide between religious and moral authority. If, however, the two are not clearly distinguished, there is no need to accept the moral neutrality that religions claim for themselves. We should look for the basis of moral responsibility.

A corporation is a social institution that is provided by the limited-liability joint-stock market, the first of which was created in 1600 in England. Legally, the primary responsibility of a corporation is to its stockholders, to its employees, and to the community. Contrast this with the case of a Union Carbide plant, where a corporation’s business had been mostly for local utility. The plant had had poorly supervised problems and accidents. People who were responsible for the board of Union Carbide. People who own it, live far away. Financial—is quite different from the local community.

The consequences for the way that impersonal corporations conduct their business are severe. The purpose of corporations is to maximize profits, and shareholders who own them are not interested in the corporation actually doing what they claim to be doing. To the extent that they conduct operations, they are not to be trusted. The reality is that we are less and less able to cope with the ever-increasing complexity of our lives.

Mechanistic science

My aim is to show that the celestial machine is to be likened not to a divine organism but to a clockwork. (Johannes Kepler)
Let's summarize the pattern so far. The collapse of the organic paradigm did not eliminate God; instead, it pushed him higher above human affairs, by severing the continuity between him and us, between the natural and supernatural. Yet denying the intermediaries that worked to sanctify this world merely created a need for more secular deities. Absolute rulers and the bureaucratic states that coalesced around them led to the formation of nations. In a parallel fashion, the asceticism of Puritan ethics filled the void by importing religious self-denial from the monastery. Thus both institutions, the nation-state and corporate capitalism, may be viewed as objectified forms of collective lack that have taken on a life of their own which nonetheless continues to draw its power from our identification with them. The lack of nation-states feeds upon our need to ground our hollow sense of self in something greater than ourselves; the lack of corporate capitalism feeds upon and legitimates the limitless desire for profit that was liberated by the loss of religious security. In both cases the institutionalization of this lack alienates it from our control (and our moral standards), so that today all of us, even CEOs and prime ministers, are subject to the impersonal dynamic of the market and the “national interest” of *raison d’état*.

If knowledge is power, as Francis Bacon famously put it, is it a further parallel to be found in the new mechanistic science that provided technical support for the military and economic ambitions of the nascent states? What insight can a lack perspective grant into the origins and perspectives of modern science?

Copernicus’s heliocentric hypothesis (1543) shook the firmament as much as gunpowder did. One could no longer trust even one’s own senses, a problem aggravated by the invention of the telescope and microscope. Luther and Calvin thought they could refute Copernicus by citing the Old Testament, but their theologies unwittingly helped to banish its God from the new material universe.

Understood most broadly, science is a matter of learning how the world works, and in a religious society this is naturally a religious activity. When everyday life is permeated with the influence of a sacral dimension, scientific causality is also a sacred causality, and the impetus to understand that causality also spiritual. Today we take it for granted that scientific knowledge is something employed to manipulate the natural world, but our preoccupation with such power should not be anachronistically identified with the medieval attitude. As the old name for science suggests, the organic paradigm did not differentiate philosophy from “natural philosophy.” The spiritual search for wisdom included an attempt to go beyond God’s creation and understand the meaning of our lives. Notice that we start from our existential need to construct a framework for life. In God’s cosmic plan the chain of beings, extending from the periphery of the cosmos, does not include humans. In Calvin’s sense of hierarchy by denying any need for a God outside the universe. Calvin, in particular, understood man’s role in the universe: “For the Holy Scriptures declare: ‘unto me every knee shall bow, every tongue shall confess’ (Isaiah 45:23) (Institutes, qu. 19, c. 7).” What were the laws of nature like? Where did the universe come from? How did the world come to be and how does it work? How does nature embody his “signatures” of his divine providence?

This had important scientific consequences. As a naturalist, Galileo Galilei (1564–1642) could observe the heavens without reference to the Bible. The physics of Galileo and John Locke (1632–1704) can be understood as a shift in the concept of causality. Newtonian physics (1665–1727) was a further process of separating the natural from the supernatural. We might say that Galileo and Locke could only imagine a God who could be mystically identified as the creator and operator of the universe, only later the impersonal force behind the universe.

A similar development occurred in natural history. John Ray (1627–1705), in his *History of the Creation* (1682) and later in his *History of Plants* (1691), first published in 1705, brought the history of plants, animals, and minerals from the Bible. The scientific view of the world was in large part a religious view of the world. The scientific search for wisdom included the search for wisdom in the Bible.
The Lack of Modernity

an attempt to understand the workings of God in the natural world. How does nature manifest God's mind and will? How do its phenomena embody his "signature"? And, most important, what does this understanding of the world reveal about our role in it, i.e., about the meaning of our lives? Notice that this spiritual impetus does not separate facts from values; the quest to discover what is not distinguished from our existential need to determine how we (part of what is) should live. In God's cosmic plan they are nondual.

Being so closely integrated, it is not surprising that the old theology and natural philosophy were overthrown together. The central concept that Protestant reformers and early scientists both challenged was hierarchy: the idea that the universe was composed of a graded chain of beings, extending from God in the highest heaven at the periphery of the cosmos, down through hierarchies of angelic beings inhabiting various celestial spheres, and then through the ranks to humans, animals, plants, and minerals of the lowest terrestrial sphere at the center of the cosmic system. The Reformation worked to depopulate this hierarchy by denying any need for intermediaries between God and his world. Calvin, in particular, minimized the role of angels in governing the universe: "For the Holy Spirit designed to provide that no one should dream of primacy or domination in regard to the government of the Church" (Institutes, quoted in Mason 70). Since the Deity predetermined all events from the beginning, the workings of the Calvinist universe were orderly and in principle fully determinate.

This had important scientific implications. According to the theory of mechanics generally accepted in the late Middle Ages, a body in motion required the constant action of a mover, and the integration of Aristotelian natural philosophy with Christian theology had identified the movers of heavenly bodies with the angelic beings mentioned in the Bible. The physics of Galileo (1564–1642), Kepler (1571–1630), and Newton (1642–1727) can thus be understood as part of this larger process of moving away from the hierarchical conception of cosmic rule, with its multitude of spiritual powers, toward an absolutist theory of the governance of the universe, according to which physical events were subject to immutable laws—originally those decreed by the Creator, only later the impersonal laws of modern physics.

A similar development occurred in anatomy. Michael Servetus (1511–1553) first published his theory of the blood's "lesser circulation" (through the lungs) in a theological treatise, the Restitutio Christianismi (1553), for such a hypothesis was implied by his denial of the Trinity.
His medical training led Servetus to doubt that the human body was
governed by a threefold hierarchy of natural, vital, and animal spirits, for
"in all of these there is the energy of the one spirit and of the light
of God." He concluded that there was only one type of blood.

These new theories suggested analogies with absolute rule that
were not overlooked by the natural philosophers themselves. More than
a century before Louis XIV (r. 1643–1715) was hailed as le Roi soleil,
Copernicus in De Revolutionibus referred to the Sun enthroned as the
ruler of the universe: "So the Sun sits as upon a royal throne, ruling his
children, which circle around him." William Harvey (1578–1657) com-
pared the heart to "the prince in a kingdom, in whose hands lie the chief
and highest authority, rules over all; it is the original and foundation from
which all power is derived, on which all power depends in the animal
body." His book on blood circulation (1628) was dedicated to Charles I,
"the sun of the world around him, the heart of the republic."

In addition to these specific implications, there was what has been
described as a concordance between the early Protestant ethos and the
scientific attitude:

In their early days, both the Swiss and the German Reform-
ers taught that man should reject the guidance and the
authority of the priests of the Catholic faith and should seek
for spiritual truth in his own religious experience: he should
interpret the Scriptures for himself. Similarly the early moder-
n scientists turned away from the systems of the ancient
philosophers and the medieval schoolmen to search for scien-
tific truth in their own empirical and theoretical experi-
ences: they interpreted Nature for themselves. (Mason 65–66)²

This led to a break with Aristotelianism and the Arabic theories that
had been dominant. "The witches, the astrologers, the alchemists, the
hermeticists, the cabalists, and even some of the neoplatonists, hungered
to find the key that could unlock some all-encompassing secret. They
would have access to the true structure of the universe if only they
discovered the proper method" (Rabb 52–53). Galileo’s insight turned
out to be the revolutionary one: "the Book of Nature is written in
mathematical symbols" by "the great Geometer," so the key to its hidden
laws is to be found by discovering the mathematical laws of the cosmos.

Today we take this perspective so much for granted that it is
difficult for us to realize how much it assumes a new and quite peculiar
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Francis Bacon (1561–1626) knew
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understanding of the relationship between God and nature. The Absolute Deity rules the universe not through a hierarchy of spiritual subordinates serving him but with a rational system of “hidden laws.” As long as these laws constituted God’s “signature” this was not quite a mechanistic view of the universe, but it was an intermediate step necessary for a fully mechanistic paradigm to develop. Again we encounter the consequences of depopulating the middle ground between God and us of all spiritual intermediaries. Where the medieval worldview saw the influence of God filtering through a hierarchy of agents, of varying degrees of blessedness and power according to their station and role in that hierarchy, the great Geometer was not to be identified with the fallen world he ruled impersonally from afar.

Since God was the ultimate source of all value, this was also the beginning of our bifurcation between fact and value. As the originator and guarantor of value gradually disappeared into the heavens, the world he left behind slowly but surely became de-valued.

This opened up exciting new possibilities: Those who comprehended his hidden laws could use them to manipulate nature for their own purposes. Originally this way of thinking was not very different from the magic employed by the Renaissance magus, who also tried to manipulate the world according to its secret laws. However,

mechanizing the world picture removed the controls over environmental exploitation that were an inherent part of the organic view that nature was alive, sensitive, and responsive to human action. Mechanism took over from the magical tradition the concept of the manipulation of matter but divested it of life and vital action. The passivity of matter, externality of motion, and elimination of the female world soul altered the character of cosmology and its associated normative restraints. (Merchant 111)

Francis Bacon (1561–1626) kept the feminine imagery but turned it to rather different ends. He described nature as a “common harlot” who needed to be “tortured” in order to make her yield her secrets. Nature should be tortured to discover God’s signature, and could be tortured because God was no longer “in” it. For this God needed to be far away, yet not too far away. Again, the political and economic parallels are instructive. Unless God were far away, there was no room and no need for absolute rulers; but if he were too far away they lost their divine
right. Unless God were far away there was no space for the capitalist ethos to develop; but if he were too far away there was no incentive to import asceticism into the economic sphere. In each case God's new role was awkward and unstable, necessary for a while but soon to be supplanted.

The preoccupation of Bacon's era, subduing chaos, soon erased the traces of God's signature. Nature no longer signified something divine but apprentices. "Matter is not devoid of an appetite and inclination to dissolve the world and fall back into the old Chaos," so bonds and handcuffs must be applied to its protean nature in order to restrain it. "The end of our foundation is the knowledge of causes and secret motions of things and of the enlarging of the bounds of human empire, to the effecting of all things possible" (Bacon, in Merchant 171, 186).

Knowledge as power for the improvement of man's estate: a great, perhaps irresistible attraction for a culture of rampant lack in a world threatened by chaos. Without the religious security provided by a universal church, the only security to be found was one that humans made themselves.

The first writer to use the term "laws of Nature" consistently was René Descartes (1596–1650), whose Discourse on Method referred to "laws established in Nature by God." "God sets up mathematical laws in nature as a king sets up laws in his kingdom," he wrote to Marin Mersenne in 1630. Descartes became the foremost exponent of the new mechanical philosophy. In addition to founding analytic geometry, he was the first to outline a system of universal mechanics that would explain all changes in the motion of bodies as caused by the impacts between them. This was the scientific consequence of his radical dualism between the physical world, whose essence is extension, and the mental world whose essence is thinking. For Descartes too a deity was necessary to create and maintain the world, but God's role was shrinking fast. The English Puritans of the seventeenth century soon developed an idea abhorrent to Calvin but implicit in Calvin's writings: that the Deity was himself bound by his own ordinances.

The laws of Newton's mechanics (Principia, 1687) explained for the first time both terrestrial and heavenly motion, eliminating the need for anything more than a Creator. The Newtonian universe was now self-sustaining and completely mechanical, except for retaining God in the wholly passive role of a privileged observer. "The Deity endures for ever, and is everywhere present, and by existing always and everywhere, He constitutes duration and space...[He] is a being incorporeal, liv-
The Lack of Modernity

It was no space for the capitalistic sphere away there was no incentive for a while but soon to be subdued, subduing chaos, soon erased no longer signified something void of an appetite and inclination into the old Chaos, so bonds of nature in order to restrain the knowledge of causes and secret of the bounds of human empire. Bacon, in Merchant 171, 1666, movement of man's estate: a great nature of rampant lack in a world's security provided by a universal order was one that humans made.

The Laws of Nature consisted of the Discourse on Method referred to God sets up mathematical laws of the kingdom, he wrote to Martrin the foremost exponent of the founding analytic geometry; universal mechanics that would bodies as caused by the impacts consequence of his radical dualistic essence is extension, and the for Descartes too a deity was world, but God's role was shrank seventeenth century soon developed in Calvin's writings: that own ordinances.

Newton (Principia, 1687) explained gravity motion, eliminating the need for the Newtonian universe was now local, except for retaining God in observer. “The Deity endures for existing always and everywhere. He is a being incorporeal, liv-
Its mechanistic approach does not refute the sanctity of the world; it merely ignores such a perspective, since it has no way to deal with it.

As with the nation-state (which can never be secure enough) and the economy (which can never be big enough), the scientific/technological project represes this failure into its future orientation: We do not yet know enough. Important discoveries are made, but every important answer breeds several more questions, even as every technological application of those answers breeds more moral dilemmas that our science and technology cannot themselves resolve for us.

To sum up: Insofar as modern science has become our collective effort to ground ourselves intellectually, by coming to an understanding of what the universe is and what our role in it is, it can never resolve our lack. Its experimental approach dualizes the one-who-wants-to-know from the objectified world that is known, because its functionalist perspective derives from, and is at the service of, our drive for ever greater control over the natural world. Scientifically, we respond to this inadequacy by funding further research, that is, by deferring to the future. In the meantime we preoccupy ourselves with the power that our increasing knowledge defers on us. What should this power be used for? Our inability to answer this question makes the means, in effect, our ends.

THE COSMOPOLIS

The dream of foundationalism—i.e., the search for a permanent and unique set of authoritative principles for human knowledge—proves to be just a dream, which has its appeal in moments of intellectual crisis, but fades away when matters are viewed under a calmer and clearer light. (Toulmin 174)

Descartes is usually identified as the founder of modern philosophy, because Cartesian thought distinguishes itself from theology, or at least embarks on the path of that differentiation. Both in its methodology (self-grounding doubt) and in its conclusions (self-grounded subjectivity), Cartesianism broke with previous ways of thinking, which were mostly religiously oriented. Philosophy achieves its own ground, for the arguments are meant to be evaluated solely according to the merit of their own logic.

In *Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity*, Stephen Toulmin offers a different understanding of these origins. Instead of accepting the usual self-descriptiveness of foundationalist project in history for the seventeenth century, Toulmin explores theologies originating from it, showing how they were a response to this philosophical problem of theology in the context of religious authority. Such foundationalism came into being early in the seventeenth century, theologically oriented thinking, which led people, in turn, to seek a search for provable certainty, blinding faith to the intellect of believers, and finally to be confronted with the empirical method.

If Europeans were not religious, they had, it seems, nothing else to believe in. The longer fight was between religious faith and rationalism, which, of course, was that Protestantism was the first to discover logic, let alone that the most religious people were the most rational. It is perhaps, human error of the most religious people was to look for "certain foundations" in the search for the certainty of the theological proofs that Montaigne overlooked. (Toulmin 3)

For Montaigne "there is no error," but the widespread difficulty of the "theological proofs that Montaigne overlooked."
The sanctity of the world: it has no way to deal with it; it can never be secure enough and it is not enough, the scientific technology to its future orientation: We do not have a solution, but every innovation, even as every technological and moral dilemma that we resolve for us.

Science has become our collective role in it is, it can never resolve the one-who-wants-to-know, because its functionalist service of, our drive for ever Scientifically, we respond to this idea, which is, by deferring to the world with the power that we should have been used to make the means, in effect.

There is no permanent ground for human knowledge, which has its appeal in the nature of things, and yet fades away when matters get closer to us. (Toulmin 174)

The origin of modern philosophy itself from theology, or at least from theology, as well as from the personal circumstances of thinking, which were achieved in the present, for the sake of the merit of Modernity, Stephen Toulmin

the usual self-description of modern philosophy, Toulmin places its foundationalist project in historical context. As we have seen, the problem for the seventeenth century was instability, and this instability had philosophical implications. The Christian schism and the fragmenting theologies originating from it were a serious challenge to the type of theological oriented thinking that had prevailed up to then. The philosophical response to this intellectual disorder was foundationalism: a search for the permanent and authoritative principles of all human knowledge. These principles were to be discovered by human rationality alone, without dependence on divine revelation or any other authority. Such foundationalism became the preoccupation of philosophy until the middle of the twentieth century, and that approach is far from dead today.

Toulmin distinguishes the philosophical response to intellectual disorder into two historical phases: a more humanist and literary period, exemplified by the influence of Michel Montaigne (1533–1592) up to about 1630, followed by a more rationalist and foundationalist period exemplified by Descartes. The eclipse of Montaigne's more broad-minded tolerance occurred because of a growing dissatisfaction with skepticism.

which led people, in turn, into an unwillingness to suspend the search for provable doctrines, an active distrust of disbelief, and finally to belief in belief itself.

If Europeans were to avoid falling into a skeptical morass, they had, it seemed, to find something to be "certain" about. The longer fighting continued, the less plausible it was that Protestants would admit the "certainty" of Catholic doctrines, let alone that devout Catholics would concede the "certainty" of Protestant heresies. The only other place to look for "certainties of belief" lay in the epistemological proofs that Montaigne had ruled out. On reflection, perhaps, human experience might turn out to embody clairvoyance and certainties that Montaigne and the skeptics had overlooked. (Toulmin 55, his italics)

For Montaigne "there is nothing that throws us so much into dangers as an unthinkable eagerness to get clear of them" (Essays 124), but the widespread difficulty in coping with an excess of lack anxiety kept his skeptical tolerance from providing a viable alternative to some
dogma to be believed in, either Christian or rational. In either case, nothing less than certainty would do. People will die for a dogma who will not stir for a conclusion, as Cardinal Newman put it, but in some cases the difference is hard to see. So Descartes founded modern philosophy and modern subjectivity by attempting to ground knowledge on the indubitability of his own doubt. This preoccupation with deductive logic based on axiomatic self-grounding was followed by Baruch Spinoza, who not only constructed hisEthica in deductive form but rewrote Descartes'Meditations into the same geometric format. Religious certainty had been wounded, but lack continued seeking to secure itself, and intellectually this meant a compulsive need for propositional certainty. If philosophical certainty is not to be found outside us, it must be located inside, in our mental processes. Cartesian dualism juxtaposed the mechanical causality of natural phenomena with the logical rationality of human thought and intentionality. The foundationalist trajectory of modern philosophy was set.

As Toulmin emphasizes, this self-grounding rationalist dream was always illusory:

"We no longer ground all our knowledge in universal, timeless systems today, only because the rationalist dream was always illusory. Descartes never faced classical skepticism on its own ground, instead, he pointed to subjects in which, within practical limits, formal logic can provide a kind of coherence to which Montaigne had done something less than full justice; but the implication that these examples were the model for all intellectual disciplines remains an unfilled dream. Nor does the fact that no such model is available today imply the "death" of Rationality; rather, it marks our awakening from a transient, ambiguous daydream. (174)"

Again we can notice a parallel with the political, economic and scientific responses to a transcendentalized God. Descartes' break with the old paradigm was not very clean, for he soon found it necessary to reintroduce God to protect his cogitations from deceptions that might otherwise be introduced by an evil deceiver. Cartesian and other rationalist philosophy still required a deity to maintain the universe, but his tenure too proved to be limited. ... And what secular god would take his place? We do not need to look very far. The eventual disappearance of the philosophers' God left his religious and moral functions to a subjectivity increasingly alienated from the elevated value and meaning from the transient daydreams of the Cartesian logit.

THE IDOL

To what powers has a man given the paradoxes of his life, nature has he strung out his free energies? ... Each and all, without knowing it, but allegiance to some kind of deity.

Our human lack was to be natural from the natural—transcendentalizing God—so the deities, which have evolved to control the earth and its creation to its own objective and, more often than not, escape ethical issues, were consequences. "National identity, that most of us would refuse, is a liability of corporations and that we remain largely ignorant of the logical consequences of our research and its technological themselves, but nature divided into spiritual protection, can be called "resources."

We may summarize by saying that this lack was originally "but the human sense of lack still manifest in them, now that God's signature has faded.

The important point is that the lack of our lack—is still present in the nation economy, and the Enlighten..."
Subjectivity increasingly alienated from a factual “objective” world desecrated of value and meaning. Philosophy today may have awakened from the transient daydream of foundationalism, but the nihilistic implications of the Cartesian legacy continue to haunt our nightmares.

The Idolatry of Modernity

To what powers has a man given himself in order to solve the paradoxes of his life? On what kind of objective structure has he strung out his meanings and fenced off his own free energies? . . . Each person lives his version of the real without knowing it, by giving his whole uncritical allegiance to some kind of model of power. (Becker 1971, 186)

Our human lack was unable to cope with bifurcating the supernatural from the natural—with desacralizing the everyday world by transcendingalizing God—so it filled the void by creating more worldly deities, which have evolved into the “secular” institutions that now control the earth and its creatures. Today each claims to operate according to its own objective and morally neutral laws, but these laws presuppose the mechanistic and atomistic paradigm of modernity. Rather than escaping ethical issues, they deny or diffuse responsibility for their consequences. “National interest” allows us to rationalize acts of state that most of us would refuse to perform as individuals. The limited liability of corporations and the anonymity of the stock market ensures we remain largely ignorant of, and protected from, the social and ecological consequences of our pooled economic decisions. Scientific research and its technological application are perceived as neutral in themselves, but nature divested of a spiritual dimension, and thus of spiritual protection, can be freely dissected and divested of its “resources.”

We may summarize by contemplating what has happened to the lack that was originally “built into” these now impersonal institutions. If the human sense of lack is a constant, how does our collective lack still manifest in them, now that absolute sovereigns, the Protestant ethic, and God’s signature have faded away?

The important point is that the deity has not really disappeared. From a lack perspective, “God”—that is, the solution we cannot help seeking for our lack—is still present in the functioning of the nation-state, the market economy, and the Enlightenment scientific/technological project, because
these collectivities do not self-exist but are "empty" processes that depend on our energy input and continue to be motivated by what may be described as institutional lack. The history of the nation-states system demonstrates that they are externally unstable and internally self-aggrandizing. Economically, GNP is never big enough, corporations are never profitable enough, consumers never consume enough. And the same is true for our scientific and technological establishments: the Faustian problem is not that we do not yet know enough, but that we never can, as far as their functionalist perspective subordinates them to our drive for ever greater control over the world.

Each, then, may be considered a victory of means over ends. The objectification of our lack into impersonal "secular" institutions means that basic questions about the meaning of our lives—the central spiritual issue for a being that needs to understand and resolve its own sense of lack—have become alienated into a "not yet enough" that can never be enough. For all three, power has become an end in itself, which is why there is something demonic about them. Power, although sometimes a good servant, is a bad master, because you can never have enough power if power itself is the goal. That points to the basic nihilism of "secular" modernity: the lack of an overtly spiritual grounding to our lives means that this preoccupation has become religiously compulsive. Because this compulsion is not understood by us, these institutions have taken on the lives of their own which subordinate us to them while accepting no substitution to anything else.

Secularity has been a basic concept for our understanding of modernity, but the distinction we usually make between a secular society and a religiously grounded one needs to be replaced by one between societies that are ostensibly spiritual and those that are unconsciously spiritual: spiritual, that is, in the basic existential sense of addressing our inescapable need to ground ourselves and feel real. Remember what Norman Brown said about the Oedipus complex, or rather Oedipus project: It is essentially the attempt to deny our conditioned origins and defend our fragile sense of independence by becoming self-sufficient. In my Buddhist terms, it is the ongoing (because never successful) attempt to overcome the sense of nonbeing or unreality that we become conscious of as a sense of lack. The problem with deifying the nation-state, corporate capitalism, and the Enlightenment scientific/technological project is, finally, that our lack cannot be resolved in those ways.

If the spiritual need to ground ourselves must be addressed, the issue becomes whether we will choose authentically spiritual versions of

this quest, or whether we continue to indulge our idolatrous ones. This chapter concludes Buddhist roots of evil—suggests a broader understanding of human self-consciousness (for, as we try to "become real" by cultivating the world as the source of our being, we live in a more constricted world, with other possibilities. Insofar as our collective corporate capitalism, scientific achievements set the tone for a constricted world, with other socially permitted perceptions, let what is define what could be.

Yet what is the alternative? Does authentic religiosity lend itself to expanding our allegiances and changing the story of our lives? Human beings believe in . . . a third course open. For . . . a concrete object . . . the conditioned, and this is liberating, even though we also achieve its highest form. The fact of the unconditioned cosmically turns to God as ultimate free people have now the highest ground for measuring perspective on earthly lives.

Buddhism uses a different point: all things, including ourselves, are not self-existent, our authentic spirituality is not something one believes in and works to maintain, not the unconditioned cosmic
are "empty" processes that depend to be motivated by what may be an unstable and internally self-sufficient one. Corporations consume enough. And the technological establishments: the once and forever big enough. Whatever idols man remains rooted to are idols designed precisely to hide the reality of the despair of his condition: all the frantic and obsessive activity of daily life, in whatever country, under whatever ideology, is a defense against full human self-consciousness" (Becker 1974, 194). Idolatry occurs whenever we try to "become real" by completely identifying with something in the world as the source of our power. Psychologically idolatry is akin to fetishism, and like fetishes, idolators gain their security at the price of living in a more constricted world, with narrowed perception and fewer possibilities. Insofar as our modern world is dominated by nationalism, corporate capitalism, scientism, and technopoly, today we all live in such a constricted world, with other possibilities foreclosed by our blinkered, socially permitted perceptions. This is the very "essence of idolatry—to let what is define what could and ought to be" (Lerner 25).

Yet what is the alternative? If idolatry is inauthentic religion, what does authentic religiosity look like? Again, I think Becker points the way: The problem of life is how to "grow out of" our idolatries by expanding our allegiances and preoccupations:

Human beings believe either in God or in idols. There is no third course open. For God is the only object who is not a concrete object. ... God is abstract necessity, the unconditioned, and this is liberating rather than opposing or confining, even though we submit our energies to it. Humanity achieves its highest freedom when energies are allied with the unconditioned cosmic process. Free human beings must turn to God as ultimate support for meaning because truly free people have nowhere else to turn. That is, to God as the highest ground for meanings, as the uncompromising critical perspective on earthly authority (Becker, in Liechty 59).

Buddhism uses a different vocabulary to make much the same point: all things, including ourselves and Buddhas, are "empty" (sunya), so we should not be attached to any of them. The touchstone of authentic spirituality is not whether one believes in God but whether one believes in and works to ground one's energies in what Becker calls the unconditioned cosmic process.
What does this imply for the modern institutions whose religious roots have been discussed in this chapter? I think it becomes obvious that we should not look to the nation-state nor to corporate capitalism nor to the scientific/technological establishments that service their ambitions for solutions to the problems they have created (e.g., the environmental crisis, addictive consumerism, increasing social injustice). This is not just because they have created the problems, but because to a large extent they are the problems. Instead of appealing to national governments for solutions, we need to work for more decentralized political institutions that will allow for increasing local self-governance and more direct participation. Instead of hoping that transnational corporations and market mechanisms can be used to solve the problems they themselves have created,\textsuperscript{11} we need to rein them in by rewriting their corporate charters, the legal umbilical cords that could be used to subordinate them to greater social concerns. And since scientific inquiry is functionally unable to set self-limits on what it tries to discover and how those discoveries are to be used, scientific ambitions, like corporate ones, must be firmly subordinated to more democratically determined goals. Today the many ethical issues raised by genetic research, in particular, make this an urgent issue. It will not be easy to decide how this new knowledge should be developed and used, but it is becoming more evident that the worst solution may be leaving it to market forces and their political allies and technological servants.

This approach to history through a Buddhist understanding of our lack stands Marx on his head. Instead of reducing a superstructure of philosophical and religious ideology to some materialist infrastructure, I have argued that an unacknowledged repression of a spiritual character has played a significant role in the development of modernity. Yet Marx may have been right about something else. If the approach adumbrated here is valid, it is not enough for us just to understand it. The three roots of evil must be exposed and challenged, not only personally but structurally in the idolatrous institutions of modernity.

\section*{The Lack}

Much like today, the events of the later seventeenth and eighteenth centuries pointed to a crisis in social order and governance. The idea of order was coming apart at the seams, and the idea of a new order seemed to demand a more truly democratic one, which would be unremittingly linked to the idea of social justice.

Civil society has become a term that is often used to describe the activities of public leaders and scholars who seek to promote a new order that seems to agree that a strong democracy, which would be unremittingly tied to the idea of social justice, is worth fighting for. The purpose of this chapter is to examine some of the ideas and institutions that have been overlooked in the development of civil society. It is clear that the idea of European nation-states in the eighteenth century was an attempt to consolidate power into the hands of a small group of individuals who would use that power to serve the interests of the state.